Remittances and Travel Restrictions
Rules governing money and travel between the United States and Cuba affect family survival, private enterprise, and the regime's access to revenue.
Remittances are funds sent to Cubans by relatives and friends abroad, especially from the United States. They pay for food, medicine, repairs, transportation, and small businesses that state salaries often cannot support. U.S. rules have repeatedly expanded and restricted these transfers according to changes in presidential policy. Current Treasury guidance authorizes family and certain non-family remittances without a general dollar cap, while excluding designated Cuban officials, senior Communist Party members, and specified relatives from eligibility.
Travel policy has changed just as often. President Barack Obama eased family visits, educational travel, and remittances during the diplomatic opening that began in December 2014. The Trump administration later restricted individual “people-to-people” travel, cruises, certain lodging, and financial transactions involving military-controlled entities. In 2022, the Biden administration removed the $1,000-per-quarter cap on family remittances and restored some travel categories. These shifts have made ordinary families dependent not only on politics in Havana, but also on election outcomes in Washington.
U.S. law still prohibits travel to Cuba solely for tourism. Travel-related transactions must fit one of twelve authorized categories, such as family visits, journalism, religious activity, professional research, education, humanitarian projects, or support for the Cuban people. The policy aims to permit contact while limiting revenue to institutions controlled by the armed forces and security apparatus. In practice, the distinction can be difficult because military-linked conglomerates have dominated hotels, retail networks, transportation, and payment channels.
Remittances relieve suffering, but they also expose deep inequality. Cubans with relatives abroad can obtain hard currency, imported goods, and business capital, while those without family support depend more heavily on rationing and devalued state wages. The Cuban government blames U.S. sanctions for hardship, yet its own centralized controls, currency policies, repression, and restrictions on independent enterprise also deepen the crisis. As of 2026, existing authorizations under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations remained in effect despite additional sanctions authorities.